



INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PURE AND APPLIED RESEARCH IN ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY

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PERSONALIZED PRIVACY PRESERVING USING SENSITIVE ATTRIBUTE GENERALIZATION

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Accepted Date:

27/02/2013

Publish Date:

01/04/2013

Keywords

Anonymous database,
Personalized Anonymity,
K-Anonymity,
Generalization,
SA-generalization

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Abstract

The most important principle of privacy is that individual has the freedom to decide the/her privacy preferences, which should be taken into account when data holder of privacy preserving micro data released to the researcher. Whenever an update is performed on anonymous database the database should be anonymous after the update. The previous work on updates to anonymous database used the concept of k-anonymity. The paper proposes a model to perform updates on personalized anonymous database by performing QI – generalization and SA generalization. In this paper Different modules are described performing the above described tasks. The First Module i.e. the admin module output for Patient view is also shown.

INTRODUCTION

Large amount of sensitive information about citizens accumulated in the databases of government agencies and private organizations, such as Social Security Administration, banks, and health care providers, has been increasing steadily in the past decades. While it has long been realized that there is a need to protect the information both in storage and transition, it has recently become apparent that the information needs to be properly guarded from unauthorized disclosure during the Process of testing newly developed applications that employ the databases.

The objective of personalized privacy is to guard the interests of peoples at the primary place. An individual can specify the degree of privacy protection for her/his sensitive values but using the concept of personalized anonymity. When a database needs to be updated by inserting a tuple which contains information about an individual, introduces two problems concerning both the anonymity and confidentiality of the data stored in the database and the privacy of the individual whose data is to be inserted. In general every individual is concerned about its privacy and also the organization to which the individual belongs to. So, the technique of personalized

anonymity can be used to make the database anonymous with minimum loss of information. For example, assume that the hospital publishes the table, which does not explicitly indicate the names of patients. However, if an adversary has access to the voter registration list in table b, s/he can easily discover the identities of all patients by joining the two tables on {Age, Sex, Zipcode}. These three attributes are, therefore, the quasi-identifier (QI) attributes. The 2 anonymous tables for micro data are shown in table c of Fig.1.

The paper proposes an update technique on personalized anonymous database. The Existing method supports on K-anonymization that exerts the same amount of preservation for all persons. Section 2 gives the detailed literature survey. Section 3 explains the problem that need to be considered. Section 4 gives the proposed work with the design view of the system. The proposed system inserts a tuple concerning information about a person in personalized anonymous database and checks whether the database still satisfies personalized anonymity.

2. LITERATURE SURVEY

In the paper [1] author proposed a formal protection model named k -anonymity for

privacy de-identification. It prevents the attack by suppressing and generalizing the Quasi-identifier attributes which can combine with public records and uniquely identify the records. A microdata release provides k -anonymity protection if the information for each person contained in the release cannot be distinguished from at least $k-1$ individuals in microdata. This paper also verifies re-identification attacks that can be realized on releases that adhere to k -anonymity.

In the paper [2] author introduces a new notion of privacy called as l -diversity. As k -anonymity protects the microdata released table against identity disclosure, it is insufficient to provide attribute disclosure. l -diversity requires that each equivalence class of dataset should have at least l represented values for sensitive attribute. Its limitation is that it is possible for an adversary to gain information about the sensitive attribute if the attacker has knowledge about global distribution of the attribute.

In the paper [3] author proposes novel privacy called t -closeness and showed that l -diversity has number of limitations as it is difficult to achieve and insufficient to prevent attribute disclosure. If the distance between the distribution of a sensitive attribute in a equivalence class and the distribution of the

attribute in the whole table is less than or equal to threshold t then the equivalence class is having t -closeness. These highly limit the amount of individual specific knowledge an attacker can learn.

In the paper [4] the author proposed technique that performs the minimum generalization for satisfying everybody's requirements, and thus, retains the largest amount of information from the micro data. It illustrates how the k -anonymity requirement can be translated, through the concept of quasi-identifiers, in terms of a property on the released table. The authors illustrated how k -anonymity can be enforced by using generalization and suppression techniques. They have introduced the concept of generalized table, minimal generalization, and minimal required suppression. l

In the paper [5] the author proposed personalized anonymity concept which specify degree of privacy for his/her sensitive values. K -anonymity has several drawbacks as discussed in the paper [5]. A k -anonymous table may lose considerable information from the microdata and may allow an adversary to derive the sensitive information of an individual with 100% confidence. This paper also explains the algorithm for deriving generalized table. The two algorithms are the

greedy framework and optimal SA-generalization.

In the paper [6] the author suggested paper deals with problems concerning privacy and confidentiality such that updates can be performed without revealing the contents of tuples and DB to the user or data provider. It exerts the same amount of preservation for all persons, resulting in more information loss in microdata release. The first protocol is aimed at suppression-based anonymous databases which allow the database owner to anonymized the tuple without gaining any information about the individual specific data and without sending new tuples owner newly generated data. The second protocol is aimed at generalization-based anonymous databases, and it works mainly on a secure set intersection protocol, to provide privacy-preserving updates on a generalization-based k-anonymous database.

In the paper [7] the author proposed the techniques which address the problems of efficiently and privately computing set intersection database oriented operations. It formalize the notion of minimal information sharing across In these paper the author proposed protocols for three operations Intersection, Intersection size and Equijoin and proved that these protocols disclose

minimal information apart from query results. It then gives cost analysis for these protocols and estimation of execution times of the application examples. It has two limitations. It do not address the problem of what the parties might learn by combining the results of multiple queries and how to find which database contains which tables and what are the attributes names.

In this paper [8] the two protocols are proposed to perform private updates on anonymous database. But these protocols have limitations, of not supporting to generalization-based updates, which is the main strategy adopted for database anonymity. Therefore, if the database is not anonymous with respect to a tuple to be inserted, the insertion cannot be performed. One of the protocols proposed in the paper is not efficient.

row #	Age	Sex	Zipcode	Disease	Guarding node
1(John)	4	M	12000	gastric ulcer	Stomach disease
2(Jill)	8	M	14000	Dyspepsia	Dyspepsia
3(Ben)	6	M	18000	Pneumonia	Respiratory infection
4(Nick)	7	M	19000	Bronchitis	Bronchitis
5(Joel)	13	M	22000	Pneumonia	Pneumonia
6(Samantha)	18	M	24000	Pneumonia	Pneumonia
7(Lisa)	24	F	58000	Flu	Φ
8(Jamie)	27	F	36000	Gastritis	Gastritis
9(Sara)	29	F	37000	Pneumonia	Respiratory infection
10(Margarette)	55	F	33000	Flu	Flu

(a) Microdata

Name	Age	Sex	Zipcode
John	4	M	12000
Jill	8	M	14000
Ben	6	M	18000
Nick	7	M	19000
Joel	13	M	22000
Samantha	18	M	24000
Lisa	24	F	58000
Jamie	27	F	36000
Sara	29	F	37000
Margaretta	55	F	33000

(b) Voter Registration List

row #	Age	Sex	Zipcode	Disease
1	[1,10]	M	[10001,15000]	gastric ulcer
2	[1,10]	M	[10001,15000]	Dyspepsia
3	[1,10]	M	[15001,20000]	Pneumonia
4	[1,10]	M	[15001,20000]	Bronchitis
5	[11,20]	M	[20001,25001]	Pneumonia
6	[11,20]	M	[20001,25001]	Pneumonia
7	[21,60]	F	[30000-60000]	Flu
8	[21,60]	F	[30000-60000]	Gastritis
9	[21,60]	F	[30000-60000]	Pneumonia
10	[21,60]	F	[30000-60000]	Flu

(c) A 2-Anonymous Table

Figure 1: Microdata, external source, and quasi-identifier generalization

3.PROBLEM STATEMENT

Consider the tables in Fig 1. The Microdata for medical facility is given in Figure 1(a) and the other database for voter registration list is given in Fig 1(b). Assume that an adversary attempts to infer the disease of Joel, knowing his age 13, sex, and zip code 22000. From the published table in Fig1(c), s/he knows that Nick may correspond to tuple 5 or 6 (the QI

values of the other tuples do not cover those of Nick). The diseases of both tuples are pneumonia; hence, the adversary can declare (with 100% confidence) that Joel must have contracted pneumonia. Again it does not take into account personal anonymity requirements.

The Existing system [6] has K- anonymized Database DB by generalizing and suppressing the tuples before performing private updates. In addition, k-anonymity fails to guarantee safe publication, even in the scenario with no personal preferences. Assume that the information related to a patient is stored in a tuple t of Database and it is kept confidentially at the server as shown in fig.2. The insertion of information about new patient in the anonymous database DB can be performed if the updated database DB U t is still anonymous. Since Database contains privacy sensitive data, main concern is to protect the identity of patient. So the database is K-anonymized by performing Generalization and suppression. While inserting a tuple in anonymous database, the main concern is to protect the identity of patient. Therefore before inserting the tuple it is anonymized and then it is inserted in Anonymous database. But the existing method provides same amount privacy to all

person which leads to unnecessary information loss.




Figure 2. Anonymous Database

4. PROPOSED WORK

As k-anonymity has several drawbacks, the concept of personalized anonymity is used. The proposed system is a new generalization framework based on the concept of personalized anonymity, as k-anonymity has several drawbacks. A simple taxonomy on attribute Disease is accessible by the public It organizes all diseases as leaves of a tree as shown in Figure 3. An intermediate node carries a name summarizing the diseases in its sub tree. Individual may specify node as the “guarding node” for his privacy, for sensitive attribute value. An individual may specify which implicit node of the taxonomy underneath all the leave is used. The empty-set preference implies that he is willing to release his actual diagnosis result for e.g. flu for Lisa in Figure 1; therefore it can be published directly.




Figure 3: Taxonomy for Disease

Personalized privacy approach provides direct protection against the association between individuals and their sensitive values. This Paper proposes private updates techniques on a Database generalized using SA generalization algorithm [2] based on personalized anonymity concept that preserves a large amount of information in the microdata release without violating any privacy constraint.

To achieve personalized anonymity SA-generalization algorithm s used. It works in two steps. In the first steps a generalization function for every QI attribute is chosen and the generalized value is obtained for all tuple $t \in T$. The Generalized tuple are divided into QI-Group. In the second step SA-generalization uses a *different* function for each group. This strategy achieves less Information loss, by allowing each group to decide the amount of necessary generalization. SA-generalization results in less precise values on sensitive attribute, it retains more information on the QI attributes.

4.1 Design View of Proposed System

Figure 4 shows view of the proposed system for medical database for a patient, where the patient registers their details




Figure 4. Design View of Proposed System

initially. The doctor can update record of patients and their treatments to the patient database. Also the doctor can retrieve information from other sources regarding the illnesses and their treatments.

The Personalized anonymous database can forward information to research center which has permission access the information. The research centre has its own access rights which will restrict use of the data. They can access only superficial data. They cannot access the patient details or the particular patient illness.

5. BASIC DEFINITIONS

The microdata which contains all information about all the patients alongwith sensitive information disease. Before forwarding these

data to the researcher, the data is made anonymous by using personalized anonymity to minimize the information loss. The Table representing the dataset is indicated by T . The publishable Table is given at T^* . The sensitive attribute value for a tuple is given by A_s . To understand the concept of personalized anonymity we should understand the following terms:

Definition 1 (A_s Subtree). For any node x in the taxonomy of A_s , we represent its subtree as $SUBTR(x)$, which includes x itself, and the part of the taxonomy under it.

Definition 2 (Guarding Node) For a tuple $t \in T$, its guarding node $t.GN$ is a node on the path from the root to $t.A_s$ in the taxonomy of A_s .

Definition 3 (Breach probability) For a tuple $t \in T$, its breach probability $P_{breach}(t)$ equals the probability that an adversary can infer from $T \setminus t$ that any of the associations $\{o, v_1\}, \dots, \{o, v_x\}$ exists in T , where v_1, \dots, v_x are the leaf values in $SUBTR(t.GN)$.


6. EXPERIMENTS

This section experimentally evaluates the effectiveness of our technique using the patients dataset. The dataset contains 100 tuples each storing information of a patient. The relation has 5 columns: Name, Age, Sex, Zip code, Disease where Age Sex Zip code are

the QI Attribute. Disease is the sensitive attribute. The modules which implements the concept of personalized anonymity is described as follows.

Admin Module 1: These module is used to insert new tuples into the dataset. There are three different view in the first module Admin view ,Doctor view and patient view. The patient view as shown in fig 5 will give access to only his/her tuple where he/she can select whether they want privacy for their sensitive information.

Personalized anonymity Modules 2:These module perform personalized anonymity on the dataset from module 1



The screenshot shows a web application window titled "Update Patient". Inside, there is a "Patient Form" with a "Patient Details" section. The form includes the following fields: "Name" (with a yellow highlight), "Age" (text input), "Sex" (dropdown menu showing "Male"), "Zipcode" (text input), "Need Privacy?" (dropdown menu showing "Yes"), and "Disease To Display To The Researchers" (dropdown menu showing "gastroitis"). At the bottom of the form are "Update" and "Cancel" buttons.

Figure 5. Module 1 Patient View

It implements Greedy framework for personalized anonymity. The greedy framework performs QI generalization on the dataset and then the SA generalization is performed on a QI group. The SA

Generalization is carried out by checking the breach probability of each tuple in QI group. If the value for probability breach value is more than the minimum considerable value then the sensitive attribute value will be set to one level up in taxonomy tree.

Results Module 3: It performs updates on personalized anonymous database. The results based on information loss of personalized anonymity and information loss of K-anonymity is compared.

7. CONCLUSION

Generalization methods using k-anonymity are inadequate because they cannot guarantee privacy protection in all cases, and often incur unnecessary information loss by performing excessive generalization. So the concept of Personalized Anonymity is becoming more important. In this paper, we work with the concept of personalized anonymity, and updates will be performed on these personally anonymized databases by using Greedy Framework. The Admin Module inserting new tuples consisting information about patient is shown in paper. So whenever a new tuple is inserted the individual will decide the level of privacy from taxonomy tree for sensitive attributes. Depending on that customized privacy requirement tuple

will be inserted into table which results mainly in less information loss.

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